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THE UNIFORM ACT
THE UNIFORM BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT
T HE formulation of a Uniform Business Corporation Act was
first considered in 1909 by the National Conference of Com.
missioners on Uniform State Laws, and the subject was presented
at numerous subsequent meetings of the conference. The Act was
tentatively adopted in 1927 and finally approved by the Confer-
ence in 1928. The result of painstaking section-by-section consid-
eration of the most practical developments, statutes, and policies
governing corporations throughout the English-speaking world,
the Act attempts to harmonize the law with reference to a number
of important and frequently litigated fields of corporate endeavor.
Although the Act is worthy of detailed consideration, it is the
purpose of this note simply to indicate in somewhat summary fasl-
ion certain desirable features of the Act and equally its less satis-
factory provisions when it is compared with existing Texas cor-
poration statutes.
QUALIFICATIONS OF INCORPORATORS
The provisions under Section 2 of the Act relating to qualifica-
tions of incorporators do not require that any of the incorporators
be residents of the state where incorporation is consummated. This
attempt to eliminate dissimilarity between domestic and foreign
corporations in this respect merely recognizes the practical result
which follows in many states requiring residence therein of at least
one or two incorporators, that a resident is secured only for the pur-
pose of fulfilling the statute with no intention of becoming or con-
tinuing a shareholder.' Such dispensing with the requirement of
residence was undoubtedly influenced by the better view of the de-
cisions that the incorporators' lack of qualification does not pre-
I TL Rv. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1305.
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vent the formation of a de facto corporation.! While there is no
requirement in Texas that the incorporators must own stock,
Article 1305' does require the charter to be "subscribed by three
or more persons two of whom must be citizens of this state."
CORPORATE PURPOSES
As a general rule, most states allow a corporation to be created
to carry on any lawful business with certain statutory exceptions.
By Article 1302,' however, Texas has enumerated more than
a hundred limited purposes for which a corporation may be
formed. This inversion has caused some difficulty in application,
particularly with respect to corporations that have been formed
for a combination of purposes. It has been the policy to limit the
right of incorporation to specific purposes authorized by statute
and to disallow additional purposes or combinations unless so
specifically enumerated. However, validity of purpose can gen-
erally be questioned only by the state; and in the case of a corpo-
ration created in part for purposes beyond those recognized by
statute, there is authority for the proposition that the excess
should be treated as surplusage.
EFFECT OF SHARE SUBSCRIPTION
Cases are at present in conflict as to the effect of a subscription
to shares in a corporation to be formed. The weight of authority,
however, seems to be that a subscription is in effect a continuing
offer by the subscribers." Another view is that the subscribers are
in privity of contract with each other. In either case, the subscriber
may generally withdraw his subscription before an acceptance by
2 American Salt Co. v. Heidenheimer, 80 Tex. 344, 15 S. W. 1038 (1891), 26 Am. St.
Rep. 743.
3 Art. 1305, supra.
4 Tux. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1302.
5 Galveston Land and Improvement Co. v. Perkins, 26 S. W. 256 (Tex. Civ. App.
1894) ; Staacke v. Routledge, 175 S. W. 444 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).




the corporation. Section 6 of the Act provides that subscriptions
shall be irrevocable for a period of one year from the date of
signing, unless revocation is justified under equity or contract
principles of rescission for fraud, duress or undue influence in
procurement. This recognizes the strong public interest in protect-
ing and maintaining resources in the form of enforceable sub-
scriptions to insure the financial stability of the newly forming
corporation. Accordingly, Sections 5 and 6 of the Act place the
incorporators and the subscribers in the same position, making
subscriptions irrevocable; upon incorporation, both automatically
become shareholders whether the stock has been paid for or not.
REQUIREMENT OF PAID-IN CAPITAL
Under existing statutes, there is a division as to the amount of
capital to be paid in upon incorporation. Twelve states, includ-
ing Texas," require a certain fund to be paid in before incorpora-
tion; nineteen jurisdictions require a certain fund to be paid in
before the doing of business: and twenty-two jurisdictions have
no requirement that a minimum amount be paid in at any time.
Section 8 of the Act requires that the corporation should not begin
business until the capital has been paid in as stated in the Articles
of Incorporation. The Commissioners' Note to Section 8 of the
Act advances several arguments against paid-in capital before
incorporation and in favor of paid-in capital before commencing
business, stating that the minimum requirement for funds to be
paid in before incorporation-generally from $500 to $1000
under most statutes-invites a minimum compliance with the
statute solely for the purpose of fulfilling the statutory prerequi-
sites and with an intention of undertaking the real financing after
incorporation. It is also advanced that since there is no corpora-
tion to receive payment, the fund must be transferred to someone
for the benefit of the future corporation, e.g., to a trust com-
pany or to the directors named in the Articles or to the treasurer.
- TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1308.
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Moreover, the consequence of a non-compliance with the require-
ment of paid-in capital before incorporation is noted, reference
being made to the Illinois case of Foster v. Hip Lung & Co.,' in
which it was held that non-compliance with the statute did not
prevent the formation of a de facto corporation; attention is di-
rected to the suggestion of the case that as a result one who became
a creditor after the certificates of incorporation had been issued
would not be able to attack the corporate existence and might
find himself bound to a corporation which had no real assets.
However, these observations are not thoroughly persuasive that
Sections 7 and 8 of the Act, requiring that funds be paid in prior to
doing business, should be adopted, especially since those statutes
requiring only $500 to $1000 to be paid in before incorporation
seem to indicate that the legislatures in those states do not give
much importance to the amount to be paid in either before or
immediately after incorporation. It is not probable that those
jurisdictions which require only a small amount to be paid in
before incorporation would, after adoption of the Act, require a
substantially larger sum, under Section 7 of the Act, to be paid in
before beginning business. Section 7 of the Act leaves the amount
to be paid in before commencing business optional. The Louisiana
Uniform Act9 provides for a minimum paid-in capital of $1000.
The Washington Uniform Act'" provides for a minimum of $500.
Article 1308 of the Texas general incorporation statute, does
indicate, however, that emphasis is placed upon the amount to
be paid in before incorporation, inasmuch as it requires that
,capital stock must be 100 per cent subscribed and 50 per cent
paid in. Since the controlling purpose of requiring paid-in capital
before incorporation or doing business is the protection of cred-
itors, the Texas statute would seem to adopt the sounder rule,
s Foter v. Hip Lung & Co., 243 IlL 163, 90 N. E. 375 (1909).
9 DuTes Gzm. STAT. (1932) 11088.
0 Rm. Rzv. STAT. 1 3803-7.
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for paid-in capital of $1000 might afford little security to creditors
of a large newly-formed corporation. Nor is it a serious objection
to the statutes requiring a certain amount of paid-in capital before
incorporation that there being no corporation in existence to re-
ceive payment the fund must be transferred to an agency for the
future corporation. Payment to the treasurer of the incorporators
or to a body selected by them, in the absence of statutory direc-
tion to whom payment should be made, is generally done with
facility.
DE FACTO CORPORATIONS
The majority of American jurisdictions early recognized the
rule that de facto corporations have a legal existence. This rule
was later adopted in England by Section 17 of the Consolidation
Act of 1918 and in Canada by virtue of Sections 4 and 111 of
the Dominion Companies Act. The general rule recognizes that
where the object is legal and there has been a good faith attempt
to incorporate and a substantial compliance with the spirit of the
statutory prerequisites, a de facto corporation is formed, and
the corporate existence is not subject to collateral attack at the in-
stance of third parties or a corporation in a suit against it. Such
action can be brought by the state only,11 and in a direct proceed-
ing. 1
2
There seems to be conffict as to whether there may be an estoppel
to deny the legal incorporation of an association that is not a de
facto corporation. One view is that there may be an estoppel even
in such event.13 A contrary view has been followed in other juris-
dictions. There have been intimations that Texas follows the latter
11 Oriental v. Barclay, 16 C. A. 193, 41 S. W. 117 (1897); Conley v. Daughters of
Republic of Texas, 151 S. W. 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
12 Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Nelson Mortgage Co., 138 S. W. (2d) 169 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1940).
13 Rogers v. Toccoa Power Co., 161 Ga. 524, 131 S. E. 517 (1926) ; Close v. Glenwood
Cemetery, 107 U. S. 466 (1882).
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doctrine,"' but Article 13171 and subsequent cases indicate a
contrary disposition."6
Section 9 of the Act is an attempt to create uniformity in the
de facto problem by making the certificate of incorporation con-
clusive evidence of the fact that the corporation is incorporated,
leaving the exclusive power of collateral attack to the state, and
then only where the corporation is invalid or illegal under the
Act, or where there is no substantial compliance with the manda-
tory provisions that are prerequisite to incorporation. By virtue
of Texas Article 1317 and the decisions thereunder, there would
be relatively little change wrought in the Texas law, as regards
de facto corporations, by adoption of Section 9 of the Act.
ULTRA VIRES ACTS
The practice of filing the Articles of Incorporation with a state
office has been assigned as a reason for precluding recovery by a
party upon an ultra vires contract with a corporation, upon the
theory that parties dealing with a corporation are charged with
constructive notice of the limitations of the corporation." In a
Virginia case'8 the court propounded a contrary rule. The court
allowed the plaintiff to recover on a note issued ultra vires, hold-
ing "that ultra vires is not a good defense where the recognition
of it will not advance justice and fair dealing." Section 10 of the
Act makes a noteworthy attempt to dispense with a portion of the
confusion attributed to the problem of ultra vires in this respect.
It provides that the filing or recording of the Articles of Incorpora-
tion and other ancillary and required papers is to be performed
14 Empire Mills v. Alston Grocery Co., 15 S. W. 200 (1891) ; Payne v. Bracken, 90
S.W. (2d) 607, uffd, in 115 S. W. (2d) 903 (1938).
1 Ttx. REv. CrV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1317.
16 Maurice v. Schwind, 101 S. W. (2d) 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ; see I HILDE-
BRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS (1942) c. 5.
.1T Richardson v. Bermuda Land & Live Stock Co., 210 S. W. 746 (Tex. Civ. App.
1919).
18 City Coal & Ice Co., Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 125 S. E. 697 (1924), noted in 10
C.ORN. L Q. 498.
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unly for die purpose of affording a public record to persons inter-
ested therein but not to operate as constructive notice of the con-
tents. In dispensing with constructive notice notions, the section
does not purport to alter the more applicable doctrines of the law
of agency which require third parties to ascertain, within reason-
able limits, the authority of the agent with whom they are dealing.
Certainly corporations should be protected from third parties who
have been palpably negligent in dealing with the corporate repre-
sentatives; but to allow the corporate body further insulation in
the form of constructive notice involves failure to recognize the
underlying desirability of a policy that fosters in the public a
feeling of security when dealing with corporate agents acting
within the apparent scope of the business.
In 1924 the Conference made its first attempt to deal with the
ultra vires problem in the Ninth Draft of the ,Lct. Prior to this
time only one state legi3lature, that of Vermont. had made a
significant effort to clarify the problem."' The existing state
statutes in American jurisdictions, and the many decisions there-
under, have produced a seeming inextricable maze of confusion
of doctrines regarding the distinctions between the authority of a
corporation to act ultra vires and the capacity to act ultra vires.-'
By Section 11 of the Act, corporations shall have the capacity to
act possessed by natural persons, but shall have authority to per-
form only such acts as are necessary to accomplish its purposes,
and which are not illegal. In theory, this is an-attempt not to
unsettle the law relating to ultra vires transactions, but to rein-
force the majority of existing decisions and lend a uniform yard-
stick to the courts. However, in the absence of additional statutory
enactments, it is to be doubted that the language of that section is
specific enough practically to effect the uniformity of decision
that is sought.
19 VT. GE . LAWS (1917) §§ 4919, 4923.
20 TEx. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1348, et seq.
2- See 1 HILDEBRAND, TEXAS CORPORATIONS (1942) c. 4; Stevens, A Proposal as to the
Codification and Restatement ot the Ultra Vires Doctrine (1927) 36 YALE L. JoUR. 297.
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HOLDING STOCK IN OTHER CORPORATIONS
Unless ancillary to the business, and in the absence of an ex-
press or implied authorization, most courts hold that it is ultra
vires for a corporation to subscribe and hold shares in another
corporation; the objections generally are that if the corporations
are different in nature, the share-holding corporation is launched
on a business not authorized by its charter,22 and if the corpo-
rations are similar there is a possible violation of anti-trust laws.
However, the power to hold stock in another corporation is often
implied on the reasoning that the effectuating of the corporate
purpose is consistent with the acquisition of the stock of another
corporation. In Texas Utilities Company v. Story,"' the court said
that "The prevailing doctine is that a corporation has no power
either to subscribe for or purchase shares of stock in another
corporation, unless such power is expressly conferred upon it by
its charter or other statute, or unless the circumstances are such
that the transaction is a necessary or reasonable means of carry-
ing out or accomplishing the objects for which it was created ...."
Section 12 of the Act endorses the use of subsidiary corporations
as agencies to carry on the general corporate business, but does
not purport to permit the corporation to engage indirectly in a
dissimilar business through the purchase of stock. It provides that
a corporation "to accomplish its purpose as stated in the Articles
of Incorporation, may guarantee, acquire, hold, mortgage, pledge,
or dispose of the shares, bonds, securities, and other evidences
of indebtedness of any domestic or foreign corporation." This sec-
tion is more or less declaratory of present Texas law with the
exception that, by virtue of Article 1349,"' a corporation in
Texas may contribute to, hold, or subscribe to, stock in another
corporation on the basis that the subscription is in furtherance of
2 2 Adams-National Bank v. Adams Co, 298 S. W. 309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
23 Texas Utilities Co. v. Story, 85 S. W. (2d) 809 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935).
24Ti. Rsv. Cry. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1349.
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a civic enterprise, without regard to whether or not it is in further-
ance of the corporate object. "'
CONSIDERATION FOR STOCK
Under Section 15 of the Act, no allotment of shares can be
made except pursuant to subscriptions or declaration of stock
dividends; and such subscriptions may be made payable with
cash, other property, or necessary services actually rendered to
the corporation. This provision is in substantial accord with Texas
Article 1308. The value of the consideration so received in pay-
ment for shares is regulated by Section 15 and Section 17 of the
Act.
The Texas Constitution provides that no corporation shall
issue stock or bonds except for money paid, labor done, or prop-
erty actually received).' Before the certificate of stock can be
issued and delivered to the stockholder, therefore, the stock must
have been paid forY Section 16 of the Act provides that no cer-
tificate shall issue until the shares represented thereby are fully
paid, and if a note is given as payment for shares, such shall not
be full payment until the note is paid. In general, the section is
consonant with the majority of Texas decisions and in accord
with the better view that to allow'stock to be issued when not paid
for, represents an outstanding liability as stock and is misleading
to third parties who should be able to assume that the corpora-
tion has received value.
Under Texas Article 1330,2. the board of directors or other
managing officers of the corporation may increase its authorized
capital stock by stockholders meeting and compliance with Article
1308 and/or Article 1538(d). Under these statutes, if property is
received other than cash in payment for stock, then the affidavit
filed with the Secretary of State must recite the cash value of the
"s A. 1. Anderson Co. v. Citizens Hotel Co., 8 S. W. (2d) 702 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
26 TEiX. CONST. (1876) art. XII, § 6.27 Zapp v. Spreckles, 204 S. W. 786 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918).
2s T.x. REv. Cry. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1330.
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property so received, its location, price, and the name of the
grantor.
In this connection, Sections 17 through 20 of the Uniform Act
constitute a significant step in the right direction. Section 17 pro-
vides that consideration for the payment of stock, other than
cash, shall be taken at a fair valuation. Under existing statutes,
this valuation is set by either the articles, shareholders, or the
board of directors acting with authority from the shareholders.
This section makes such valuations of the incorporators, share-
holders or directors conclusive, and likewise conc]usive the valua-
tion placed by the directors upon corporate assets in estimating
surplus to be transferred to capital as payment for shares to be
allotted as dividends.
Under Texas decisions, in the absence of fraud, a stockholder
is not liable for an unpaid balance due on stock because later it
is ascertained that property accepted in payment was taken at
more than its true value.2' However, it is to be supposed that Sec-
tion 20 of the Act modifies the "conclusiveness" of the valuation
given to property other than cash in Section 17.
Section 18 of the Act provides that within 90 days after an allot-
ment of shares, a report must be filed with the office of the clerk
of the county in which the corporation has its registered office,
showing (a) the total number of shares allotted, the number of
no par shares, and the number of par value shares, (b) an accu-
rate, detailed description of the consideration received or to be
received for the shares so allotted, (c) a statement of the valua-
tion placed by the incorporators, shareholders, or directors, as
the case may be, upon consideration received other than cash, and,
in the case of shares allotted as a stock dividend, the amount of
surplus transferred to capital in respect of such dividend, and
any part created by revaluation of assets and, if so, the value of
the assets on the books before and after revaluation. Failure to
comply with the section carries a substantial penalty. The purpose
29 Dysart v. Fleming, 140 $. W. (2d) 350 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
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of this provision is to provide a uniform and adequate safeguard
to the creditor or investor to enable him to determine financial
status.
Section 19 provides that shares allotted in violation of the pro-
visions of the Act shall not for that reason alone be invalid. Under
Section 20 the subscriber is limited in liability to the extent of
his subscription and, if a bona fide holder without notice of non-
payment in full, he is exempt from liability for the balance of
the subscription. A shareholder is limited in liability for the debts
of the corporation (with optional provision for statutory excep-
tions).
LIABILITY OF PARTIES
Section 20 is declaratory of the existing Texas law as regards
liability of shareholders, incorporators, directors, and officers and
is not in derogation of common-law or equity principles concern-
ing liability of such parties when engaged in fraudulent corpo-
rate practices.
TRANSFER OF STOCK
Since Texas has adopted the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, the
subject matter dealt with in Section 21 of the Uniform Business
Corporation Act, dealing with stock transfer, would necessarily
and conveniently be controlled by that Act. "' Under Section 15
of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, a corporation cannot have a
lien on shares represented by a certificate or place a restriction
upon free transfer of such shares unless the certificate embodies
such stipulations. By Section 16 of the Uniform Act, a certificate
cannot be issued until shares are fully paid for, it being contem-
plated, however, that shares might be sold on the installment
basis, and that a party might be a- shareholder when he had not
paid for his shares fully though he would not possess a certificate.
Section 22 of the Act gives the corporation a lien on such
unpaid shares for the indebtedness, and thereby obviates the
90 Trz Rzv. Crv. STAr. (Vernon, 1925) a. 1358-1 et seq.
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necessity of placing a restriction or lien upon the certificate, the
effect of which generally is only to impair the transferability of
the certificate.
DECLARATION OF DIVIDENDS
Most courts agree upon the general proposition that a corpora-
tion may not declare dividends either in the form of cash or addi-
tional shares except from the actual earnings of the company or
the surplus. Under Section 24, a dividend in cash or property
cannot be paid from surplus that is derived from an apprecia-
tion of fixed assets upon revaluation, but a stock dividend can be
so paid. In Texas, Article 1329:" provides that dividends may be
declared "of the profits from the business of the corporation." It
is evident then, that Texas corporations should declare dividends
from the surplus earnings or profits, and not out of appreciation
in value of assets, unless those assets are converted into cash. Nor
would it be proper to make payment in the form of stock dividends
in view of the wording of the Texas Constitution that "no corpo-
ration shall issue stock or bonds except for. money pail, labor
done, or property actually received ... "
Where dividends are wrongfully paid or corporate assets are
wrongfully returned, Section 25 of the Act makes the directors
who have been negligent or who have acted in bad faith liable to
the extent of the misappropriation, and the shareholders individ-
ually liable to the corporation in event of a wrongful dividend for
the amount of such payment where the directors cannot be held.
Texas Article 13458 limits stockholders' liability to the amount
of unpaid stock; and Article 1347" provides that directors who
knowingly pay dividends when the corporation is insolvent, or
which would render it insolvent, are jointly and severally liable
for all debts to the extent of such dividends.
:A TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1329.
-2 Houston Cemetery Co. v. Drew. 13 Tex. Civ. App. 536, 36 S. W. 802 (1896); TElx.
Rrv. Cry. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1353.
:3 TEx. REV. CrV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1345.
^4 Tia. REV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1347.
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Authorities are in conflict as to whether the amount of a wrong-
fully paid dividend may be secured from the bona. fide stock-
holder where the corporation is solvent. Under Section 25 of the
Uniform Act, solvency or insolvency of the corporation at the
time of dividend payment is immaterial, and apparently it an-
nounces the better view, since the shareholder is a mere volunteer
and his rights should not be superior to the interests of the
creditors and the financial stability of the corporation as a whole.
The same reasoning should apply to permit directors to be held,
whether their act is consummated during insolvency or solvency,
as the ultimate liability of either the directors or stockholders
strengthens the corporate structure and affords the creditor a
reasonable assurance of integrity.
VOTING RIGHTS
Generally, every stockholder has the right to vote at stock-
holders' meetings, unless prohibited from doing so by charter
provision, by-law, or agreement enacted prior to his acquisition
of the shares. Under Section 28 of the Act, the stockholder of
record is entitled to one vote per share standing in his name on
the books, unless otherwise provided in the Articles of Incorpo-
ration. In Texas there i's no general statute giving the shareholders
of a private corporation the right to a vote per share, to vote by
proxy, or of cumulative voting; but shareholders in railway and
insurance companies are, by statute, given a vote per share, the
right to proxy votes and, in the case of railway companies, cumula-
tive voting power." However, as a general rule in most jurisdic-
tions and in Texas, each share is entitled to one vote, either by
statute, charter, by-law, or custom.
Under sub-Section II, where voting privileges are given to a
limited class of shareholders by the Articles of Incorporation
they may be liable to the corporation for the benefit of non-voting
shareholders for breach of duty. This provision is doubtless aimed
35 Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) arts. 4718, 4803, 6289, 6293.
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at the possible abuses of "management stock." Sub-Sections III
and IV provide for cumulative voting for directors and proxy
voting.
By the general rule, the pledgor of stock may vote it until the
pledgee acquires title or transfers the shares on the corporation
transfer books. In a few states statutes define the rights as be-
tween the pledgor and pledgee in matters of voting. Texas has no
such statute, but by virtue of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act
the registered owner may vote his stock. Nor can the corporation
vote its own stock by the better view. Sub-Section V provides that
the pledgor vote his shares until transferred on the books to the
pledgee, and that persons holding shares as trustees or fiduciaries
may vote in person or by proxy. Under this sub-Section, where
shares are held without restriction by fiduciaries jointly, the ma-
jority controls the votes, and in event of equal division, a proper
court may, upon petition, appoint another party to assist the
fiduciaries in breaking the deadlock. There is conflict between the
text writers over the question of whether voting of shares held
jointly requires the unanimous consent of the holders or whether
the majority should control.:" However, the Act again announces
probably the better view since it prevents arbitrary action on the
part of one or more fiduciaries to the possible detriment of the
equitable owner of the shares. Clearly, not voting may be more
injurious than ill-advised voting.
The authorities are not in agreement as to the validity of vot-
ing trusts. A minority of jurisdictions have held such agreements
illegal in that they attempt to separate the power to vote from
the beneficial ownership of the shares and deprive the share-
holder of the free exercise of his judgment. However, the majority
of the courts sustain such agreements or trusts where the object
to be accomplished is not illegal or against public policy and is
established with a view to furthering the interests of the stock-
311 See STE.PHcNs, CORPORATIONS, p. 461; FLETCHME. CYCLOPEDtA OF CORPORATIONS,§ 2038; BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CoPRoRA ioNs, pp. 571-572.
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holders. However such pools should be condemned when fraudu-
lent or tending towards monopoly, when they create an unfair
advantage over minority stockholders, 7 or when they attempt to
evade a statute. Section 29 of the Act allows shareholders to trans-
fer their shares to a person or corporation as trustee for purposes
of voting for a period up to 10 years.
Generally, in the absence of express provision, if all share-
holders are duly notified, or if the meeting is a regular one, any
number of shareholders present represent a quorum, though they
may represent less than a majority of shares. Their action, unless
restricted by by-law, charter, or statute, binds the corporation.
There is some conflict as to whether a quorum must be present at
the time of voting. If a quorum has met, can members then with-
draw or refuse to vote and thereby prevent the action of the meet.
ing from becoming action of the quorum? Section 30 of the Act
adopts probably the better view and provides that, except where
otherwise provided in the Articles of Incorporation, the presence,
by person or proxy of the holders of the majority of the voting
power, shall constitute a quorum, and shareholders can continue
to do business until adjournment, notwithstanding the withdrawal
of enough shareholders to leave less than a quorum.
MANAGEMENT
With slight changes, Section 31 of the Act is substantially in
accord with the Texas law regarding directors. Article 1320"
requires at least three directors to manage the business. There is
no statutory requirement that directors be shareholders in corpo-
rations organized under the general statutory provisions. Article
1323 3 requires, with four exceptions, election. of directors to be
held annually and any vacancy to be filled by the remaining
board. Under this article a majority of the directors constitute a
37 Withers v. Edwards, 26 Tex. Civ. App. 189, 62 S. W. 795 (1901).
38 TE3. REv. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1320.
-9TE. REv. Cv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1323.
1947]
TEXAS LAW AND LEGISLATION
quorum. The Act adopts substantially the same provisions as the
above statutes with minor changes and coordinates the law relat-
ing thereto.
Section 32 of the Act requires the directors to elect a president,
secretary, and treasurer. Only the president need be a director.
Article 13250 provides that the directors "choose one of their
number president, and shall appoint a secretary and treasurer
and other such officers as they shall deem necessary for the corpo-
ration."
Texas courts have generally held that directors are trustees for
the stockholders and the corporation. But there is a vast difference
between true trustees, in the ordinary sense of the word, and direc-
tors of a corporation. Some courts, including those of Texas,"'
have applied the same test to their trusteeship as is applied in the
usual relation of trustee to the cestui que trust. However, it is
probably the better view that a difference should be recognized
and the directors considered agents of the corporation standing
in a fiduciary status. Since the conflict over the degree of care to
be exercised by the directors emanates largely from the status
from which that relationship is viewed in a particular jurisdic-
tion, Section 33 of the Act attempts to standardize that status by
providing that the officers and directors stand in a fiduciary rela-
tion to the corporation. Their duties are to be performed "in good
faith, and with the diligence, care, and skill which ordinarily pru-
dent men would exercise under similar circumstances in like posi-
tions."
"REGISTERED OFFICE"
The concept of "Registered Office" in Section 34 of the Uniform
Act eliminates the necessity of considering the comparative im-
portance of different offices or places of business in a state, since
it refers to the address of the business as registered with the
40 Tm. RLv. Civ. STAT. (Ve'non, 1925) art. 1325.
41 San Antonio & G. S. Ry. Co. v. San Antonio & G. R. Co, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 167,
60 S. W. 338 (1900).
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Secretary of State and circumvents the ambiguity occasioned by
such phrases as "principal place of business" used in existing
state statutes. In Texas, where the charter does not designate the
corporation's residence, the legal residence of the corporation is
the place where it maintains its office and transacts its principal
business. For purposes of venue, disregarding other advantages,
clearly the Uniform Act evidences the more practical solution.
RIGHT TO INSPECT BOOKS
In the majority of jurisdictions, in the absence of statute, the
stockholder has the right to inspect the corporate books if he
makes proper demand for inspection at a reasonable time and
for a proper purpose. Statutes in many states have been con-
strued by courts as giving an absolute right of inspection, regard-
less of the motive or purpose of the shareholder. The courts of a
few states having similar statutes, however, have construed them
not to grant an absolute right where the motive is subversive or
otherwise improper. Article 1328"' provides that the books and
records shall at all reasonable times be open to inspection of any
stockholder, without any reference to the bona fides of the share-
holder. The language is strong enough to establish an absolute
right to examine the books, anJ the Texas court has held that
such a right is given the shareholder.4 - However, the court did
qualify the right by saying that a mandamus would not be issued
to enforce that absolute right where the motives are improper.
The discretionary power, then, that is incident to the issuance of
a mandamus allows the court to read "motive" into our statute.
Such circuity of approach is avoided by Section 35 of the Act
which makes the stockholder's right to inspect 'dependent, as at
common law, on the reasonableness of the purpose or motive in
making the demand.
4"- TE:x. Rrv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1328.
43 Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp., 59 S. W. (2d) 815 (Te.-Co--. App. 1933).
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SALE OF CORPORATE ASSETS
Few jurisdictions are without statutes regulating the sale by a
corporation of its assets. By the weight of authority, if the corpora-
tion is in a prosperous condition and a sale is not necessary, the
mere majority of stockholders may not sell the entire property
with the intention of quitting business. Under Texas Article 1320
a corporation may sell its real or personal property. But this does
not authorize directors to sell all of the assets of a prosperous
business with the intention of dissolving. Article 1387"' would re-
quire a vote of four-fifths of the stockholders in a meeting called
for that purpose to effectuate such a disposition. However, a cor-
poration may, if threatened by insolvency, by a majority vote of
its stockholders, sell or dispose of its entire property. In cases of
imminent necessity, where creditors are filing suit, directors alone
may exercise this power of sale."
Section 37 of the Act allows a voluntary sale of the assets of a
corporation. If the corporation is solvent, the vote of the share.
solders as provided in the Articles of Incorporation will authorize
a sale or, in the absence of a specified percentage, a two-thirds
vote will be necessary. If the corporation is insolvent, the board
of directors may authorize the sale. In this provision, there is
no material deviation from Texas decisions.
AMENDMENTS OF CIARTER
Section 38 of the Act provides for amendment or extension of
the corporate charter by shareholders' meeting. Under this sec.
tion, if a proposed amendment alters the rights or preferences of
the holders of any class of shares, then two-thirds vote of such
holders, as a class, irrespective of other voting rights, is necessary
for approval. Ordinary amendments require a two-thirds vote of
the shareholders, or such vote as is required by the Articles of
-T=x Ri,. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1387.
"Howard v. Republic Bank & Tru Co., 76 S. W. (2d) 187 (Te. Civ. App. 1934).
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Incorporation. In Texas Article 13156 permits a solvent corpo-
ration to extend its charter by a resolution of a mere majority of
shareholders; and Article 1314 ' 7 allows amendment to be made
in the same manner as prescribed for the original charter, so
long as not violative of the Constitution or other laws or the orig-
inal purpose for which the corporation was created.
INCREASE AND REDUCTION OF CAPITAL
Under Article 13308 a corporation may increase capital stock
and issue preferred stock upon a two-thirds vote of stockholders
having voting privileges. A mere majority of voting shareholders
under Article 1538(h)" may amend the charter to provide for
par and/or non-par stock as long as there is no impairment of
rights or privileges of any class without the holders' consent. In
this respect, the protection that is afforded the shareholders under
the Texas statutes seems to be more desirable, since the share-
holder should be free to assume that his stock will not be impaired
by subsequent corporate amendment to which he individually does
not assent. However, with the exception of certain specified in-
stances, the general'statutes in Texas and Article 1314 are silent
as to the percentage vote that is required for the validity of amend-
ments.
Section 41 of the Act provides for the reduction of capital
stock of a corporation by a resolution adopted by two-thirds vote
of the shareholders at a meeting called for that purpose. Articles
of Reduction are required to be filed with the Secretary of State
showing the financial condition of the corporation and that the
reduction will not impair the existing debts and liabilities.
MERGER AND CONSOLIDATION
Independently of statute, unanimous consent of shareholders is
eTEL Rcv. Crv. STAtT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1315.
'T. REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1314.
48 TrL Rrzv. Crv. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1330.
49 TEL REv. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 1538(h).
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generally necessary to sustain certain corporate acts, such as con-
solidation or merger, transfer of assets, or radical amendment.
However, statutes have been passed in many states granting wide
powers to specified majorities in such matters. In enacting these
statutes, many legislafures realized the necessity of an ancillary
protection or remedy to the dissenting shareholder; that although
a small group should not be able to prevent the majority from
doing with the corporation what they deem most expedient, yet
the minority should not be forced to continue in an enterprise
radically different from the venture upon which they originally
embarked, or in an essentially altered status." Accordingly, Sec-
tion 42 of the Act provides for the repayment of the value of
the shares to the dissenting shareholder if the corporation would
be solvent after such payment where the corporation has (a)
authorized the sale, lease, or exchange of all of its assets, (b)
authorized an amendment changing the corporate purpose or
extending duration, or (c) changed the rights of the holders of
any outstanding shares.
Generally, corporations can consolidate or merge lawfully only
where expressly permitted to do so by statute. In Texas there are
various statutory and constitutional provisions authorizing merger
and some specific prohibitions.' Sections 43 to 48 of the Act deal
with consolidation, and constitute a codification of the more gen-
eral concepts of that problem. Section 42 of the Act, however, is
silent on the matter of prohibited consolidations, providing that
"any two or more domestic corporations . . . or any domestic
corporations and foreign corporations" may consolidate. Sections
49 to 60 of the Act deal with the problems of dissolution of private
corporations.
CONCLUSION
The Uniform Act, as drafted, does not purport to offer an
infallible solution to the ever-increasing complexities encountered
50 See Levy, Rights of Dissenting Shareholders to Appraisal and Payment (1930)
15 CORN. L. Q. 420.
5L See 3 HILDFBRAND, TExAs CORPOPATIONS (1942) § 985.
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in the many fields of present-day corporate endeavor, yet it
would be but a truism to say that the Act is a substantial attempt
at advancement of uniform corporate legislation. The Act has
been based upon the experience of the various states, and where
conflict in policy or statute has been encountered, the Commis-
sioners have selected the policy which appeared to be supported
by the majority of the courts or the better reasoning.
John R. Wilson.

